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THE CONSTITUTION AS HARD LAW 
Michael S. Moore* 
On hearing that our topic was the "Constitution as Law," one 
of my colleagues remarked that he thought "there was a case on 
that." Yet our topic is not the power of judicial review as estab-
lished by Marbury v. Madison.' Rather, our topic is captured by 
another famous John Marshall opinion, McCulloch v. Maryland,2 in 
which Marshall proclaimed that "we must never forget that it is a 
Constitution we are expounding .... "3 The Constitution, in other 
words, seems different from ordinary law in some important ways, 
and our goal is to pinpoint and assess those differences. 
More specifically, we are invited to focus on one alleged differ-
ence between constitutional law and ordinary law. Because this al-
leged difference is so loosely characterized by the metaphors of 
"hard" versus "non-hard" law, I shall devote the first part of my 
remarks to clarifying what should be meant by "hard law." Only 
after I have clarified our benchmark, hard law, will I address 
whether constitutional law differs significantly from it. 
I 
"Hard law" could mean law that is value-free in its derivation 
and in its application to particular cases-legal positivist theories of 
law and legal formalist theories of adjudication. Yet if that is the 
sense of "hard law" that we use in asking whether the Constitution 
is hard law, the answer is obvious: No, and neither is any other 
kind of law. So I eschew taking the question in such a way that it 
invites us, once again, to berate positivist and formalist theories. 
Not only has that been done before but such a task does not get at 
the differences that more plausibly may exist between (value-laden) 
constitutional law and (value-laden) ordinary law. 
Suppose we think of "hard law" as that mode of reasoning that 
is text-based and interpretive ("hermeneutic"), that is, reasoning 
• Robert Kingley Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center, 
and Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. 
I. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
2. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
3. /d. at 407. 
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that is constrained because it must justify its outputs as being the 
correct interpretation of some authoritative text. Psychoanalytic 
dream interpretation, for example, is hermeneutic because it has a 
method for discovering the text to dreams-all remembrances 
count as the manifest content-and because it has an interpretive 
method-free association, symbolism, and patient recal1.4 The legal 
reasoning that interests us ("hard law") is a particular kind of her-
meneutic reasoning that I shall call normative hermeneutic reason-
ing.s For law is unlike dream interpretation, literary interpretation, 
and verstehen-style social science, in one salient respect: legal inter-
pretations are given to justify future actions and decisions. Legal 
interpretations, like theological interpretations, are to give reasons 
for action to persons, whereas the interpretations of non-normative 
hermeneutics do not. 
That difference means that in law, as in religion, we need two 
kinds of normative theories. We need a theory of authority that 
justifies taking some text to be authoritative for our decisions. Such 
a theory should tell us why some text gives us what Raz calls "con-
tent-independent reasons" for action, that is, reasons whose force as 
reasons depends on their utterance by one in authority and not on 
the correctness of their content.6 Second, we need a theory of inter-
pretation with some real bite to it. The theory must truly exclude 
from our decision some of the things we would have included in the 
absence of that authoritative text. 
The best example of "hard law" in this hermeneutic sense is 
statutory law. For with statutes there is a plausible normative the-
ory justifying why judges and citizens should regard these texts as 
authoritative. Such texts were authored by a body that ought to 
make the major social choices in our society; this, because that body 
is democratically elected, institutionally well-suited for such general 
decisionmaking, and constitutes an effective check on the power of 
two otherwise not so undangerous branches of government; and 
this, in tum, because democracy is good, well-designed rule-issuing 
bodies issue better rules, and absolute and unchecked power is bad. 
4. See Moore, The Nature of Psychoanalytic Explanation, in 3 PsYCHOANALYSIS AND 
CoNTEMPORARY THOUGHT 459 (1980). 
5. For the concept of normative hermeneutic reasoning, see Garet, Comparative Nor· 
mative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Literature, Constitution, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 35 (1985). Also 
appreciating the normative hermeneutic nature of theology, as opposed to literary criticism, 
see Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. I (1984). 
6. ]. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 23-109 (1986). Like Raz, when I speak of 
authority I mean practical authority, not theoretical authority. On broader, non-normative 
uses of interpretation, see Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: 'A Turn for the 
Worse', 41 STAN. L. REV. 101 (1989). 
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And so on.7 
We also have a persuasive normative theory that justifies a 
method of interpretation that has some bite to it. We should inter-
pret statutes (1) by the ordinary meaning of the words that appear 
within them, (2) as modified by the technical legal meanings intro-
duced by statutory definitions or prior court interpretations, (3) so 
as to check both ordinary and technical meaning by the purpose a 
rule of this kind ought to serve in a just society, and (4) so as to 
check meaning and purpose by an all-things-considered value judg-
ment that acts as a safety-valve against wildly absurd or unjust re-
sults. The normative theory that justifies this method of 
interpretation is the full panoply of rule of law values, not just the 
three-fold subset of those values I mentioned a moment ago (de-
mocracy, institutional appropriateness, and checks and balances-
the separation of powers values). The enhancement of liberty by 
making the law predictable, the substantive fairness of protecting 
justified reliance on what the law provides, formal equality, and 
procedural fairness, join the separation of power values to justify 
the above-sketched theory of interpretation for statutes.s 
What makes statutory law hard law is not that it is value-free, 
because it isn't. Both the theory of authority and the theory of in-
terpretation are value-laden. Despite this, the value judgments that 
they call forth in judges are different from those that judges would 
make in the absence of applicable statutes. The value judgments 
made in the application of hard law (statutes) are restricted by the 
existence of an authoritative text, a restriction not found in ordinary 
moral reasoning.9 
Because there are two aspects to law being "hard," there are 
two kinds of examples of non-hard law: law where there is no au-
thoritative text, and law where there is no theory of interpretation 
that significantly restrains the application of such a text. Both the 
common law and a pure natural law view of law (what is morally 
obligatory is also legally obligatory just because it is morally obliga-
tory) are examples of the first kind. For neither the common law 
nor the natural law have an authoritative text.w If law were as in-
determinate in its application as Legal Realists in their more ex-
7. This argument (for the authority of statutory texts) is more fully spelled out in 
Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 314-15 (1985). 
8. This method of interpretation and the justification for it are spelled out at some 
length in Moore, supra note 7. 
9. That moral reasoning is like scientific reasoning in that neither is text-based, is ar-
gued for in Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 1061. 
10. That the common law is textless is argued for in Moore, Precedent, Induction, and 
Ethical Generalization, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 183 (L. Goldstein ed. 1987). 
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treme moments proclaimed, even statutes would be examples of 
"non-hard" law of the second kind. For to say that law has only 
"paper rules," allowing judges to reach any result under them, is to 
say that the text, although authoritative, does not constrain deci-
sions under it significantly. 
The question that this sense of "hard law" poses regarding the 
Constitution is this: Is constitutional law like statutory law, both 
because there is a text granted authority over judges by some per-
suasive normative theory and because there is a theory of interpre-
tation that both has some real bite to it in restraining judges and is 
itself persuasively justified? Or is constitutional law either textless 
like natural law and the common law, or so indeterminate in its 
method of applying its texts as to be functionally textless despite the 
existence of a written text? I shall consider each of these two pos-
sibilities in order. 
II 
What is the text of our Constitution? The question seems to 
have a straightforward answer: it is the relatively short document 
that Hugo Black used to bring out of his pocket on various occa-
sions, the document that consists of a preamble, seven articles, and 
twenty-six amendments. Let me see if I can now make this question 
less facile. One way that this question has been clouded is by the 
scholarly debate about there being an "unwritten constitution" in 
America.11 The real constitution, it is sometimes urged, is some 
higher law; or some contemporary social consensus; or some tradi-
tion; or what the Supreme Court has said it is; and so on. The 
modem impetus for this debate is Douglas's opinion in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,12 finding a right of privacy in the Constitution but not 
in the text of any of the written document's articles or amendments. 
This way of grounding the right of privacy led some scholars to 
speak of "non-interpretive review," that is, review when there was 
no text to be interpreted;I3 others called it interpretive review, but 
enlarged the text being interpreted to include natural law, social 
consensus, or Supreme Court precedent.I4 
II. See, e.g .. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 
(1975); Moore, The Written Constitution and lnterpretivism, 12 HARV. J. OF LAW AND PuB. 
PoL 1501 (1989); Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? (to appear inS. CAL. L. 
REV.). 
12. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
13. See, e.g., Grey, supra note II. 
14. Compare Grey, supra note 5. This kind of debate of course is much older than its 
more recent incarnation about privacy. The debate of forty years ago, which was about in-
corporating the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment's due 
process clause, also had this character to it. The way Hugo Black had framed that debate, 
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Despite the clouding over of the issue in each of these ways, I 
now want to argue that the simple and obvious answer first given is 
the right answer. The only authoritative text of the Constitution is 
what is written in the document itself. 
There are two sorts of arguments with which this conclusion 
might be established. Let me call them first order and second order 
arguments. The first order arguments are familiar. They take posi-
tions on the merits about what are and what are not proper things 
for the courts to take into account as they decide constitutional 
cases: for example, "our allegiance is to the document and not to 
what our predecessors on the bench may have said about it;" or, 
"each generation is entitled to live under its own basic ideals and 
thus present social consensus should represent the true Constitution 
which our judges apply." 
Second-order arguments are more modest in their aim, for they 
do not seek to determine the proper ingredients for consideration by 
judges. Rather, such arguments are "second-order" because they 
are about the first-order arguments, seeking to allocate such argu-
ments to some debate other than that over the text of the Constitu-
tion. Specifically, the second-order argument I wish to make seeks 
to allocate these familiar first-order arguments to the debate over 
the theory of interpretation and away from the theory of what is an 
authoritative constitutional text. Better to debate the role of social 
consensus, Supreme Court precedent, tradition, natural law, and 
the like, in the context of how to interpret the Constitution. 
My second-order argument is not based on some supposed ana-
lytic truth about what constitutions are-that they must be written 
texts. Constitutions may be unwritten tradition, evolving consen-
sus, precedent, natural law, and the like, and still be constitutions 
for different societies. My second-order argument is normative (not 
conceptual) and particular (not universal) in its application to our 
Constitution. It should be seen as the written text. 
The argument depends on there being a differential degree of 
acceptance of the written document over any of its competitors for 
the honorific title, "U.S. Constitution." The Constitution is-as 
trite as it now is to say it~ur civil religion. From Thomas Paine 
("in America the law is king"), through de Tocqueville, to the Bork 
the due process clause by itself was too nebulous to serve as an authoritative text; only by 
incorporating the more specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights into the clause could one say 
that there was a text with authority over judges. Even older of course is the question of 
whether the ninth amendment's unenumerated rights can serve as a unwritten text for judi-
cial review. This debate, like the privacy and incorporation debates, makes it much less obvi-
ous that the text of the Constitution is just what is written down in seven articles and twenty-
six amendments. 
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confirmation hearings, Americans have given the Constitution a 
surprising degree of respect bordering on awe and reverence. And 
the thing that commands such quasi-religious fervor is the written 
document. It is this text that is the symbol of our civil religion, not 
Supreme Court precedent or our own present consensus. 
This sociological fact about Americans does not generate, by 
itself, the normative conclusion that the written document ought to 
be authoritative for American judges. At most, this fact by itself 
can generate only the further sociological inference that most 
judges, like most Americans generally, in fact accept the authority 
of the written document.ts But the normative question of whether a 
judge should grant authority to the written document vis-a-vis other 
candidates for the Constitution, is not answered by a sociological 
observation about accepted authority.t6 
So I raise the symbolic nature of the written document as the 
basis for an explicitly normative argument: since there need to be 
some symbols to hold a society together, and since we have one that 
is so well accepted, why tamper with it? The written document 
serves this unifying, symbolic function well, better than any likely 
replacement, so we should continue to grant it the honorific title, 
"U.S. Constitution." 
If such an argument is persuasive, then it mandates that the 
written document be the exclusive text constituting the U.S. Consti-
tution. That does not mean that courts should not look to Supreme 
Court precedent, social consensus, natural law, and the like; only, 
that if and when they do so, they are interpreting a preexisting text, 
not supplementing it, supplanting it, or rewriting it. 
Saying this, perhaps surprisingly, does not fully resolve the 
question of what the text of the U.S. Constitution is. Even restrict-
ing ourselves to the written document as the only candidate for an 
authoritative constitutional text, there are still numerous possibili-
ties as to what we take that document to be. Consider four: 
(1) There is first of all what I shall call the syntactic constitu-
tion: the written document regarded only as a string of uninter-
preted symbols. It is "syntactic" because the string satisfies 
whatever tests for law our theory of authority might impose. Such 
15. As should be evident from the text, I do not regard the question of authority as a 
question of sociological fact. See Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: 
A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL L. REv. 603 (1985). 
Rather, for a text to have authority is a normative question settled affirmatively only when 
one can justify that a text should be so regarded. 
16. I put aside the weak normative conclusion that Gerald Postema seeks to derive 
from the fact of acceptance of authority by judges. Postema, Coordination and Convention at 
the Foundations of Law, 11 J. OF LEG. STUD. 165 (1982). 
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strings are thus, as logicians might call then, well-formed formulas, 
that is, formulas that satisfy those rules of formation and transfor-
mation that make up the syntax of a language. But as uninterpreted 
strings these symbols have no meaning; that is supplied by a theory 
of interpretation. 
So taken, the constitution would be authoritative not because 
of anything that it says-for so taken, it doesn't say anything. 
Rather, the syntactic constitution would be authoritative only be-
cause these uninterpreted symbols were laid down in a way that 
satisfies the test for authoritative constitutional law. 
(2) Second, there is what I shall call the semantic constitu-
tion. Here, one consider the written document not only to be laid 
down in a way that conforms to our rules of legal syntax, but also to 
be a document whose sentences have ordinary English meaning. 
The symbols are thus not completely uninterpreted. They are par-
tially interpreted, in the sense that, prima facie, the sense to be as-
signed them is their sense in ordinary English. 
What has authority, on this sense of the constitution, is the 
document as it would be understood by a competent speaker of 
English who had neither legal training (and thus did not introduce 
technical legal meanings) nor knowledge of the historical context in 
which the document was written (and thus lacks any historical 
clues from which to infer what the framers of the document might 
have meant by their written words). 
(3) Third, there is what I shall call the pragmatic constitu-
tion. By "pragmatic," I do not mean "practical," "expedient," and 
the like. Rather, I mean to invoke the linguists' sense of "pragmat-
ics." Pragmatics is part of a theory of communication, the part that 
studies how the context of an utterance contributes to the sense the 
utterance possesses either to its author or to his audience. The 
pragmatic constitution, accordingly, is the written document inter-
preted as the authors of it themselves would have understood it or 
as their original audience understood it (if the latter is different 
from the former).I7 
(4) Finally, there is what I shall call the implied constitution. 
17. So taken, what would have authority as "the constitutional text" would be a more 
fully interpreted document. Not only would the document possess the meaning assigned it by 
ordinary English semantics, but also would have the meaning assigned it as a function of the 
context of its utterance by a particular set of speakers to a particular audience. Even this 
richer interpretation of the document, however, is far from being complete; for while context 
may lessen ambiguities and vagueness in language, it does not eliminate these features. A 
speaker's aims in speaking, as Hart once reminded us, may in fact be fully as indeterminate as 
the language with which he has chosen to communicate them. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW 125 (1961). 
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Any user of language presupposes or implies more than he explicitly 
asserts. If I assert that the present King of France is bald, I presup-
pose (as a matter of appropriate utterance, not as a matter of se-
mantics) that there is a King of France.ts Douglas's example in 
Griswold was, that if the first amendment states that "Congress 
should make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech," it pre-
supposes that persons also have a right of association: "while [such 
right of association] is not expressly included in the first amend-
ment, its existence is necessary in making the express guarantees 
fully meaningful."19 Put in linguistics jargon, it would be pragmati-
cally inappropriate in the context of authoritative pronouncement 
to say, "everyone can speak freely" without at the same time pre-
supposing, "everyone can get together for purposes of speaking 
freely to one another." 
Which of these four constructions of the written document is 
our Constitution? As before, there are a number of persuasive first-
order arguments to the effect that ordinary word meaning is a good 
thing for courts to consider as they decide constitutional cases, or 
that the original understanding is not. Indeed, I have made some of 
these arguments in detai}.2o But in the present context it is a sec-
ond-order argument that should govern. As a matter of allocating 
arguments about the role of plain meaning, framers' intent, or prag-
matic implication in constitutional law, I think such debates are 
better had within the theory of interpretation. The only authorita-
tive constitutional text should be the syntactic constitution, the doc-
ument as a set of as yet uninterpreted marks on paper. 
This spare notion of the Constitution keeps all of the compet-
ing ingredients in constitutional reasoning in one arena, the theory 
of interpretation. Framers' intent, for example, should have to 
compete not only with plain meaning, but also with precedent, 
evolving social standards, and natural law for pride of place in con-
stitutional law. Since some of these items will surely be in any plau-
sible theory of interpretation, the rest should as well. That way, 
some such items-notably framers' intent and original understand-
ing-do not get an illegitimate leg up (because already included as 
part of the text). 
The "leg up" for framers' intent, original understanding, or 
plain meaning would be illegitimate because of a point analogous to 
that made earlier about what it is that Americans accept as authori-
18. See generally L. LINSKY, NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS (1977); Russell, On Denoting, 
14 MIND 479 (1905). 
19. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483. 
20. Moore, supra note 7, at 320-21, 352·58; Moore, Originalist Theories of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 73 CORN. L. REV. 364 (1988). 
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tative text. They accept the document itself as a set of marks. Not 
that they think it has no meaning; but they accept it as authoritative 
without knowing in any detail what that meaning is. Indeed, when 
confronted with pretty standard applications of the Bill of Rights, 
they may well reject such applications-until they learn that they 
are discussing part of the sacred text. 
If this is right, then the only text whose authority is uncon-
troversially accepted is the syntactic constitution. By the argument 
earlier given, widespread acceptance of the syntactic constitution as 
authoritative justifies a judge in regarding it as authoritative for his 
decisions. This does not tell the judge what the text means. It tells 
only what it is that he must now find the meaning of. 
We should consider the text of the Constitution as a string of 
uninterpreted symbols for yet another reason, perhaps the most ba-
sic of all. We can approach this reason by asking what it is for us to 
grant a text authority over our deci~ions. What is it for religious 
persons to grant authority to some religious text such as the Bible 
or the Koran? We have answered this above in terms of content-
independent reasons: to grant authority to a text is to think that 
interpretations of that text create new reasons for action that may 
compete with and override other reasons we would have considered 
in the absence of such a text's authority. If we think through the 
idea of a text giving content-independent reasons we will see that 
the only text that can be authoritative is an uninterpreted text. 
Suppose a devout Christian were to say that the Bible had au-
thority over the decisions he made in his life because it said many 
wise and true things and because it preached to us to do the good. 
Such a person does not regard the Bible as authoritative. For notice 
he himself decides what is wise, true and good, interprets the docu-
ment to see how it measures up, and finding a correspondence, only 
then grants it any "authority." Yet the "authority" is illusory, for 
the text doesn't create a new reason that will now compete with his 
own moral and epistemological considerations; the text only con-
firms what he already decided about these matters. 
For a text to have authority for a person he must accept it, not 
because he agrees with what it says, but rather, independently of his 
agreeing with what it says. In the religious case, he must accept the 
Bible because it is God's word, whatever that word might mean. In 
the example of statutes, to grant real authority to them as texts is to 
accept them because the legislature passed them, not because we 
know what they mean and agree with them. 
Thus, the only sense of "text" that fairly poses our question of 
authority is text as a string of uninterpreted symbols appearing in a 
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certain two hundred-year-old document.21 Is there a persuasive 
normative argument making this text authoritative for us? Since 
there is such an argument for statutes, let us first pursue its ana-
logue about the U.S. Constitution. 
Let us call this the historical consent theory. According to the 
theory, we should regard the constitutional convention as a demo-
cratically elected legislature in that it represented all of us. There-
fore, its output, whatever it means, should be considered as having 
authority over us. The problem with such a theory, of course, is 
that the convention wasn't much like a modern legislature. It was 
neither very representative in its makeup at the time, nor, more im-
portantly, were the persons then present our representatives. None 
of us got to select who would represent us in the framing of this 
document. 
To meet this last objection one might eschew historical consent 
for an implied (but current) consent theory. Such a theory would 
urge that we all impliedly consent to the authority of the text by not 
amending the document, or overturning it entirely. Yet the prob-
lem with this theory lies in its ignoring of the obvious: amendments 
(to say nothing of revolutions) are difficult to bring off, so that not 
trying hardly manifests consent. 
There are also hypothetical consent theories: Structure a 
choice situation in a fair way and ask what constitution a rational 
person would consent to; if the document that results is our Consti-
tution, then that text has authority.22 Yet hypothetical consent the-
ories (unlike actual consent theories) cannot by their nature justify 
the granting of authority to a constitutional text. For such theories 
require the rational chooser to know what the text means and 
choose it only if it corresponds to what he previously believed to be 
good and just. The Rawlsian veil of ignorance cannot require its 
chooser to be ignorant of the meaning of the text he is choosing, yet 
that is just what granting authority to a text requires.23 
The upshot is that there is no normative theory justifying the 
Constitution as an authoritative text that is at all analogous to the 
21. I explore in much greater detail what it is to grant a text practical authority over 
our decisions in Moore, Law, Authority. and Razian Reasons, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing, Issue No. 3, March, 1989). 
22. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
23. Hypothetical consent theories thus ultimately are but a kind of more straightfor-
wardly substantive theories of authority, such as Larry Simon's. Simon, supra note 15. Such 
theories grant authority to the Constitution only because its clauses by-and-large describe the 
good and the right. Yet by any useful notion of authority, this is no authority at all; for one 
antecedently decides what is good or right, and gives the text "authority" only insofar as it 
gets it right. In which case the text is idle; our pre-existing obligations to do what is good and 
right are not increased by the existence of the Constitution's text. 
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normative theory justifying statutes as such a text. Social contact 
theory does not make the constitutional text authoritative for us in 
the way democratic theory makes statutory texts authoritative. 
Nonetheless, as argued above, the constitutional text is the object of 
America's "civil religion;" it is accepted as authoritative in a way 
religious texts are accepted by religious persons. That social fact 
gives the Constitution authority, not because authority is a social 
fact, but because a well-legitimated document is a good that ought 
to be preserved. 
III 
Is there a constraining interpretive method, and a persuasive 
normative theory justifying it? Here the analogy of constitutional 
law to statutory law is stronger, for the same method of interpreta-
tion that ought to be applied to statutory texts should also be ap-
plied to the constitutional text.24 In each case the interpreter begins 
with the ordinary meaning of the words, modified by any technical 
meanings given them by prior court interpretations, and balances 
both the ordinary and technical legal meaning against the meaning 
the word should be given so as to maximize both the purpose the 
rule in question should be seen to serve and the more general aim of 
justice. 
It is sometimes thought that constitutional interpretation must 
be different from ordinary legal interpretation, and that in particu-
lar ordinary meaning cannot play the constraining role in constitu-
tional interpretation that it can play in statutory interpretation. 
The reason for this difference, it is further thought, lies in the differ-
ent natures of the texts being interpreted. The language of the con-
stitutional text is thought to be much more open-ended than the 
language of typical statutes (recognizing that sometimes statutes ap-
proach the open-endedness of the grand constitutional phrases, as in 
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act). 
If we press those who believe in the difference, they seem to 
have five distinct attributes in mind. The language of the Constitu-
tion compares unfavorably to typical statutory language in that it is: 
more general, more vague, more open-textured, more ambiguous, 
and/or more value-laden. For each of these reasons, it is thought, 
the ordinary meaning of constitutional language cannot be plain 
enough to constrain judges significantly in their interpretation of 
that language. 
Yet none of these five alleged attributes of the constitutional 
24. I so argue in Moore, supra note 7. 
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text justify this conclusion. Let us consider each separately. Gener-
ality in the sense here pertinent has to do with the size of the set of 
things referred to by some predicate; larger set, more general predi-
cate.2s "Animal" is more general than "horse," "color" is more 
general than "red," because the set referred to by the first of each 
pair of terms includes the set of things referred to by the second, 
and more besides. So construed, generality is not incompatible with 
precision. Just because a set is large does not mean that the borders 
of the set are fuzzy. For example, the set of things described by the 
predicate, "is a prime number," is very large (infinite), yet the bor-
ders of such a set are not fuzzy. Moreover, where we do have 
fuzzy-bordered sets, the fuzziness is not necessarily proportional to 
the size; the set of colored things is no fuzzier than is the set of red 
things. 
"Generality" in this context is usually a misnomer, for what 
the proponents of the "constitutional language-is-different" thesis 
actually believe is that constitutional language is vague ("general" 
serving as proxy for "vague").26 And the constitutional clauses we 
most care about are, as a class, more vague than are the clauses of 
typical statutes. Does this greater vagueness mean that the consti-
tutional interpreter runs out of meaning sooner than the interpreter 
of a typical statute? That depends on what one thinks meaning is. 
The most popular theories of meaning for words and sentences 
in a natural language such as English, are what I have elsewhere 
called conventionalist theories.21 On these theories of meaning the 
meaning of "death," for example, is given by some linguistic con-
vention, which convention is abstracted from the usage patterns of 
native speakers of English. Such convention may specify a defini-
tion-a set of synonymous descriptions-or it may specify a stan-
dard example of someone who is "paradigmatically" dead. In 
either case, to run out of conventions is to run out of meaning. 
Since vagueness is a conventional feature of language use-a word 
is vague when competent native speakers don't know what to say-
greater vagueness means a greater number of items for which there 
is no governing linguistic convention, and hence, no guidance by 
such convention (meaning). 
Yet meaning, both in linguistics and in constitutional law, is 
better conceived as nonconventiona1.2s The meaning of "death," 
for example, is not given by the conventions that govern standard 
25. For the relevant meaning of "general," see Moore, supra note 10, at 192. 
26. On vagueness, and its distinctness from generality, see Moore, The Semantics of 
Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 193-200 (1981). 
27. Moore, supra note 7. 
28. Jd. 
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usage of the word by native speakers of English. Rather, the mean-
ing of "death" is given by the nature of the kind of event that death 
really is. Such nature is a matter of theory-partly scientific, partly 
moral-not a matter of convention. This being so, the degree of 
vagueness of language used in some text is irrelevant to the gui-
dance provided to an interpreter by that text's ordinary meaning. 
To run into the vague penumbra of some word's application is only 
to run into the area where linguistic convention has run out. It is 
not to be in an area where there can exist no determinate, correct 
answer by virtue of meaning alone. Someone may be really dead (or 
really alive) even if conventional definitions or examples of "death" 
don't resolve the matter. 
The grand clauses of the Constitution, such as "cruel and unu-
sual punishment," "unreasonable search and seizure," or "equal 
protection of the law," are vague; they possess greater vagueness 
than do most statutes. Yet if the meaning of "equal protection of 
the laws" is given by the nature of the thing referred to-equality-
and not by the conventions derived from the standard usage of the 
word, "equality," then the vagueness of the phrase cuts no ice as an 
argument for indeterminacy in the phrase's correct interpretation. 
If one is skeptical of the determinacy of such phrases, it cannot be 
because they are vague; rather, such skepticism must proceed from 
a deeper skepticism about there being anything (equality) whose na-
ture can guide meaning. 
Before coming to that skepticism, let me briefly consider two 
characteristics of language often confused with vagueness, namely, 
open texture and ambiguity. Before H.L.A. Hart turned the phrase 
"open-texture" into a virtual synonym for "vagueness" in the litera-
ture of legal theory,29 it named not vagueness but what Friedrick 
Waismann called the possibility of vagueness.3o Waismann's idea 
was this: beyond the ordinary fuzziness of language that one recog-
nizes as vagueness, there exists an ineliminable possibility that we 
won't know what to say when confronted with wildly novel situa-
tions. "Cat" is vague insofar as we don't know where to draw the 
line between kittens and cats. Yet "cat" is also open textured be-
cause we also would not know whether to apply the word to a crea-
ture that looks and acts just like a cat except that it literally 
disappears into thin air every so often. 
Thus, to say that constitutional language is more open-textured 
than the language of statutes would be to say that there are greater 
unforeseen possibilities for vagueness in constitutional law. I don't 
29. H. HART, supra note 17, at 121-32. 
30. Moore, supra note 26, at 200-02. 
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know whether this claim is true or not, but notice that even if it 
were true such a claim is as irrelevant to the comparative determi-
nacy of constitutional language as is the analogous point about 
vagueness. For open-texture, like vagueness, is a conventional fea-
ture of language use; it is also premised on the assumption that to 
run out of conventions is to run out of meaning. This is just the 
premise that we should reject. So what if most competent speakers 
of English would not know what to say of Waismann's hypothe-
sized, disappearing cat-like object? It either is or isn't a cat, which 
we would resolve by applying the best theory we have as to the 
nature of the natural kind of thing that is the species, cat. 
Comparatively greater ambiguity of the constitutional text, un-
like vagueness and open-texture, would make a difference in the de-
terminacy of meaning of that text. For unlike vagueness or open-
texture, ambiguity has to do with distinct senses existing for a word. 
The word "bore" in the sentence, "our mothers bore us," is ambigu-
ous between the sense, "socially stifling," and the sense, "carrier of 
fetuses." As such, ambiguity of text does present a problem for de-
terminate guidance of an interpreter of that text; for such an inter-
preter does run out of meaning (in the sense of having too many 
possibilities) if the word before him is ambiguous. Even if the 
meaning of a word is given by the nature of the thing referred to by 
that word, and not by convention, if there are two or more distinct 
kinds of things referred to by that word, the interpreter faces a 
choice that meaning alone cannot resolve. 
But what reason is there to think that the Constitution's lan-
guage is more ambiguous than the language of typical statutes? 
There is nothing ambiguous about due process of law or establish-
ment of religion, vague as these clauses might be. Often those who 
tout the ambiguity of the Constitution's great clauses usually would 
be better served to frame their point in terms of vagueness, not 
ambiguity.Jt 
31. Consider John Marshall's discussion of the purported ambiguity of "necessary" in 
the "necessary and proper clause": 
The word "necessary," is considered ... as limiting the right to pass laws for the 
execution of the granted powers, to such as are indispensable . . . . 
Is it true, that this is the sense in which the word "necessary" is always used? 
Does it always import an absolute physical necessity . . . . Such is the character of 
human language, that no word conveys to the mind, in all situations, one single 
definite idea .... A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispen-
sably necessary. To no mind would the same idea be conveyed, by these several 
phrases. . . . This word, then, like others, is used in various senses .... 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 414-15. 
Marshall's point is better put as a complaint about the vagueness of "necessary": How 
necessary must a power be to be constitutionally necessary to the exercise of some expressly 
granted power? The relevant sense of "necessary" in the clause is not in doubt, for Marshall 
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The fifth and last alleged difference is that the Constitution's 
text uses value-laden words whereas most statutes do not. Giving 
persons the process that is due them, giving them equal protection 
of the laws, protecting them from cruel punishments, unreasonable 
searches and seizures, and abridgments of their freedom of speech, 
all seem to be ways of expressing evaluations. For some, that seems 
to mean that the meaning of the words used in such clauses cannot 
significantly constrain a judicial interpreter of those words. 
This view of the indeterminate (and thus nonconstraining) na-
ture of evaluative discourse is based on a skepticism about values 
against which little can be said here.32 One brief point is perhaps 
sufficient. Notice that evaluative usage of a word constitutes no ba-
sis whatsoever for inferring that it lacks determinate meaning. Take 
"murderer." The word is often used to express negative evaluations 
of another person or another person's actions, as in, "you're a mur-
derer!" The conventional illocutionary force of the word may even 
be that of expressing such disapproval. Yet that the word can be 
used with such force, and even typically used with such force, in no 
way persuades anyone that the word lacks reference (namely, to a 
class of persons who have intentionally killed).33 
As we have just seen, the alleged difference in the determinacy 
of meaning between the Constitution and ordinary statutes is usu-
ally made as a possibility claim: the ordinary meaning of the Con-
stitution's language cannot provide as much guidance. Sometimes, 
however, a normative claim is being made: the ordinary meaning of 
the Constitution's language should not be given the same con-
straining role that it has in statutory interpretation. In Marshall's 
reminder that "it is a Constitution we are expounding," presumably 
some such normative point was lurking. 
In thinking through why a freer, less constrained mode of in-
terpretation might be justified for constitutional interpretation, we 
first must recall the values served by a constraining theory of inter-
pretation for statutes. These are the rule of law values. Due defer-
or anyone else. There are different senses of the word "necessary"-logically necessary, ana-
lytically necessary, causally necessary, or, to divide a controversial pie differently, epistemi-
cally necessary, semantically necessary, and metaphysically necessary; but Marshall does not 
think the linguistic context of "necessary" in the necessary and proper clause leaves each of 
these senses equally viable. The relevant sense is "causally necessary," and the problem is the 
vagueness of that sense because the word's meaning does not seem to determine how much of 
this kind of necessity there must be. 
32. But a lot can be said elsewhere. See Moore, supra note 9. 
33. It is thus not an independent ground for suspecting constitutional language of inde-
terminate guidance, that it expresses evaluations. Lots of words can be used to express evalu-
ations and yet describe the world with great precision. So this last alleged difference, when 
taken to be a point about the supposed vacuity of evaluative discourse, depends on one of the 
preceding four points. And with their collapse falls away this last point as well. 
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ence to the democratic legislature, enhancement of predictability 
and hence of liberty, the furthering of substantive fairness by the 
protection of citizen reliance, and procedural fairness, are all served 
by an interpretive method for statutes that gives considerable 
weight to the ordinary meanings of English words and sentences.34 
In addition, equality, liberty, substantive fairness, and efficiency are 
served by giving weight to the technical meanings for statutory 
words added by prior courts' interpretations.3s 
These values are also served, but not to the same extent, by 
giving weight to ordinary meaning and precedent in interpreting the 
Constitution. To begin with, there is no analogue to the value of 
giving due deference to a democratically elected legislature; for the 
constitutional convention lacked those features possessed by legisla-
tures that justify deference. Second, the liberty, substantive fair-
ness, and procedural fairness values are less fully served by using 
ordinary meaning in constitutional interpretation to the extent that 
the language of the Constitution is more vague than the language of 
typical statutes. For although meaning is not indeterminate when 
language is vague, knowledge of that meaning is less available to 
ordinary speakers when the language is vague. It is knowability, 
not existence, of determinate meanings that enhance liberty and 
both kinds of fairness. 
Thus, prima facie, a constitutional interpreter should give 
somewhat less weight to the constraints of ordinary or technical 
legal meaning than he does in statutory interpretation. Correspond-
ingly, he should also give more weight to the less formal ingredients 
in a proper interpretive method, namely, the ingredients of purpose 
and the safety valve, all-things-considered judgment of justice. For 
the Constitution deals with matters of the greatest public impor-
tance, and getting it right thus looms larger in comparison to the 
rule of law virtues than is the case with most statutes. 
For both of these reasons, there is some truth to Marshall's 
normative injunction that we should interpret the Constitution in a 
somewhat less constrained way than we should interpret an analo-
gously worded statute. Even so, the difference is one of degree only, 
for the rule-of-law values are maximized by constrained interpreta-
tion of the Constitution too, and such values are not moral light-
weights on anyone's theory of morality. 
Our topic reminds me in many ways of certain similar issues in 
other fields. Psychiatrists for many decades have been debating 
34. More fully spelled out in Moore, supra note 7, at 320-21. 
35. /d. at 371. 
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whether the stuff that they treat, mental illness, is really an illness.36 
International lawyers for as long have debated whether the stuff 
with which they deal, international law, is really law. Constitu-
tional lawyers seem to be afflicted with like doubts about the subject 
matter of their field. 
Orthodox constitutional lawyers exhibit the need for reassur-
ance given by an affirmative answer to such questions, also shared 
by orthodox psychiatrists and international lawyers: Mental ill-
nesses are real illnesses, international law is law, and yes, constitu-
tional law is law, too--and not just law, but hard law at that, the 
central stuff that gives the word "law" its meaning. Not being a 
constitutional lawyer, I do not share the understandable need for 
professional legitimization. But I do share the answer: Constitu-
tional law is "hard law" in the two dimensions of hardness that I 
have identified: (1) there is a text and a plausible normative theory 
justifying why that text is authoritative; and (2) there is a con-
straining interpretive method and a plausible normative theory jus-
tifying use of that method in constitutional adjudication. There are 
some differences of degree, but they are only that; they do not make 
the Constitution anything other than what it itself describes itself 
as: "the supreme law of the land." Marshall, incidentally, could 
not have thought differently than this, despite his famous language 
in McCulloch. After all, it was only because the Constitution was 
fundamentally like ordinary law that judicial review could be 
justified.37 
36. Compare, T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS {1961), with M. MOORE, 
LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP ch. 4. (1984). 
37. As Marshall himself argued in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
